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Abstract
Western Sahara has been in a state of political crisis since Spain granted the
territory to Morocco and Mauritania in 1975. While Morocco has attempted to
incorporate the region within its borders, the Polisario Front (Frente Popular
de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro) has challenged Morocco’s
claims and proclaimed they are the voice of the indigenous Sahrawi people.
Algeria, home to a majority of the Sahrawi refugees, continues to support
the Polisario and their goal of independence from Morocco.
Yet, does Algeria have an ulterior motive for their actions beyond
support for a displaced people? This thesis examines how Algeria has utilized
the Western Sahara conflict to undermine Morocco’s plans for incorporating
the territory. Applying hegemonic stability and rivalry theory to the conflict,
Algeria’s methods of challenging Moroccan claims are analyzed to see how
its actions have weakened the objectives of Morocco towards Western
Sahara as well as the perception of Morocco within the Maghreb region and
internationally. The thesis suggests that as Algeria continues its support for
the Polisario, it may have successfully challenged Morocco’s attempt to
incorporate the territory within its borders.

iv

Figure 1: Map of Western Sahara, with Berms marked. The Polisario Front (governing party of the Sahrawi
Arab Democratic Republic) control areas east of the berms and temporary capital located outside Tindouf,
Algeria. Morocco controls areas west of the berms.
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Westernsaharamap.png)
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Chapter 1: Conceptualizing Algeria in the Western Sahara
conflict
Why is there a continued conflict in Western Sahara? After nearly forty
years of conflict and cease-fires, negotiations and UN involvement,
Morocco is no closer to achieving a successful end-game in which they
control the territory. The Polisario Front (Frente Popular de Liberación
de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro), a rebel group against Spain,
Mauritania and Morocco in the 1970s which struggled for independence
and now is recognized as the governing body for the Sahrawi Arab
Democratic Republic (SADR) continues to demand for independence
and recognition against Morocco’s wishes. To this day the conflict is at
a standstill with both sides continuing to advocate different actions
that would settle the conflict – for Morocco, official recognition of its
claims on the territory and merging it fully within the state, for the
Polisario, recognition of independence and properly establishing the
SADR in El Aaiún.
This thesis is based on the following hypothesis: Algeria’s
support for the Polisario is a strategy by Algeria to become the sole
regional hegemon in the Maghreb. Regional hegemon is the
dominant state within a region, based on the concepts created by
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Kindelberger and Russett in the formation of hegemonic stability. In
terms of region, it is defined as a cluster of states within
geographically bound areas. In this case, Algeria and Morocco are
bound together due to proximity and location within the Maghreb
(Arabic for West). The Maghreb region consists of Morocco, Algeria,
Libya, Tunisia, Mauritania and the Western Sahara territory (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Map of the Maghreb (www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/32/017.html)

The states in the region share a geographic zone linked around the
Atlas Mountains and the coastal plains of the Mediterranean Sea.
Historically the Maghreb has been classified as the northwest of Africa
and originally was only Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and western Libya.
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Mauritania was grouped with the region in 1989 after the founding of
the Arab Mahgreb Union (Africa Research Bulletin, 2012). The region
shares common history due to conquest by the Ottomans as well as
France and Italy.
The argument is that Algeria continues to be involved in the
Western Sahara conflict from a power politics position against their
rival Morocco, and that its political goals for the North West African
region are supported by maintaining support for the Polisario Front
against Morocco. While both Morocco and Algeria seek to be the
dominant force in the region and over the future of Western Sahara,
not as much scholarly work has been done on how Algeria has
undermined Morocco, especially in regards to Western Sahara. This
makes examining Algeria’s role in the conflict more relevant to the
discussion and adds a new dimension to understanding the relationship
between the Moroccan government and the Polisario. Singling out
Algeria’s role in the conflict allows its position to be analyzed against
Moroccan interests in Western Sahara to see how regional views on
the conflict have shifted. It allows for further discussion on how Algeria
could be viewed as a viable hegemon in the region due to its ability to
prevent Morocco from achieving its political goals in regards to
Western Sahara.
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Why single out Algeria and Morocco for consideration for
dominance in the region? Considering the relative size of the region
and spending power the states have militarily (Table 1), only Libya
would be able to challenge Morocco and Algeria for supremacy in the
region. Tunisia spends far too little in military spending and is
currently in the process of moving towards a more democratic, yet
possibly more fundamentalist state in the wake of the Arab Spring
(Zelin, 2011) and Mauritania continues to struggle economically and
politically since independence.
Table 1: General statistics on the states in the Maghreb region1
Morocco

Algeria

Mauritania Tunisia

Libya

32,309,239

35,406,303

3,359,185

10,732,900

6,733,620

(2011)

(2011)

(2011)

(2011)

(2012)

446,550

2,381,741

1,030,700

163,610

1,759,54

GDP

163 billion

264.1

7.242

101.7

92.62

(US

(2011

billion

billion

billion

billion

Dollar)

est.)

(2011)

(2011

(2011

(2010

est.)

est.)

est.)

Population

Area
(sq.km)

N/A
(2011)

1

Military

5% of GDP

3.3% of

5.5% of

1.4% of

3.9% of

Budget

(2003

GDP

GDP

GDP

GDP (2005

est.)

(2006)

(2006)

(2006)

est.)

Information on all states gathered from the CIA Factbook, accessed July 2012
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However, with the marginalization of Libya during the end of the
twentieth century and the fall of Col. Mummar Gadaffi in 2011, Libya
has become less secure and viable as an alternative to Morocco and
Algeria in the region. Further, the thesis is focused around the
problems in achieving a solution in Western Sahara, which Tunisia,
Mauritania and Libya have been removed from for some time –
although Libya had supported the Polisario under Gadhafi (Zunes and
Mundy, 2010) and Mauritania has recognized the Polisario as the
official representative of the Sahrawi (Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, 2008). Morocco and Algeria, while having faced
their own protests during the Arab Spring (Amos, 2012 and Nossiter,
2012), have been able for the most part avoid major challenges to the
government’s authority and have emerged stronger with the instability
in Libya.
With the Algerian government supporting the Polisario and
defending the demands of the Sahrawi for an independent state,
questions should arise in regards to its own interest in the conflict.
What role does Algeria play in the conflict? How has Algeria been able
to influence the international community’s perception on Morocco’s
interest in Western Sahara? Can they gain an advantage over Morocco
without directly participating in the negotiations towards a settlement?
By supporting the Polisario and the Sahrawi people, is Algeria pursuing

6

its own agenda which could frustrate efforts towards a settlement?
These questions are the focus of this thesis
The operating theory for the work surmises that a state will
support opposition groups in a neighboring state if it will enable the
state to become a regional hegemon. Theoretically, the idea of the
regional hegemon is built off the work of John Mearsheimer. In his
work The Tragedy of Great Power Politics he argues the notion of
“offensive” hegemony (4-5) in which states and great powers alike
seek out opportunities to undermine rivals. As states desire as much
power as possible and try to maximize relative gains in power (23), it
continues to drive competition between states. The idea is further
developed by authors like Michael McGinnis, who argued the idea of
regional rivalry within the framework of Cold War politics and
competition (1990). While Mearsheimer’s work deals with “great
powers” like the United States and the Soviet Union, his concepts on
hegemony and the role of regional power politics allows for greater
application and perspectives within the confines of this work.
Mearsheimer’s work also explains the concept of the regional
hegemon, which sees states trying to exert dominance over others on
a regional level.
On a global scale, the United States has been considered the
main hegemon in economic, military and political spheres. The regional
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aspect to hegemony suggests that dominance by one state can be
exerted on a smaller scale within the international community. By
having states compete against each other for dominance and
leadership on a smaller scale, rivalries between states can develop as
they seek new ways to gain prominence on the local level and position
themselves as the hegemon within its region. Utilizing the work done
by others on rivalries between states only adds to the development of
Mearsheimer’s work and understanding of how power and influence
work on the micro levels of state-state politics.
The objective of this thesis is to develop a better understanding
of how hegemonic stability can be applied to the regional or
subregional level, in particular within the context of regional rivals
Algeria and Morocco. Since regional rivalry is still being developed
theoretically, the games the Great Powers played in the past can be
applied in some ways to the actions taken by smaller actors seeking to
promote its interests and goals amongst its neighbors. The focus of
this analysis will be on the behavior of Algeria towards its rival
Morocco, and whether the failures of achieving a final agreement on
the Western Sahara conflict is a result of Algeria’s rivalry with Morocco
for regional hegemony. In other words, is Algeria’s objective to
undermine Morocco’s goal of incorporation of Western Sahara into
greater Morocco, or is Algeria’s support of the Polisario Front and the

8

Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) a strategy towards
becoming the hegemonic power in the region.
With Morocco and Algeria considered rival hegemons in the
Maghreb (Cordesman, Burke and Nerguizian, 2010), studying Algeria’s
role as a possible deterrent towards peace in Western Sahara allows
for a better understanding of how states can interfere with intrastate
politics and create the conditions that allow for relative gains. Such
gains, Mearsheimer argues, allow for greater security of the state. He
sees the system as one within a realist framework, without the right
agency to protect states from each other they must become more
ambitious and seek out power against its rivals. For a state to achieve
hegemony within a region, it must capitalize on beneficial situations
that better position itself against others (21). Building on the work of
McGinnis, this capitalization will allow the state to have an advantage
over regional issues and better itself in the long term.
To understand Algeria’s position in the conflict, the thesis will
take a case study approach towards both Morocco and Algeria in
regards to Western Sahara. It will examine Morocco’s interest in the
area and how Algeria has challenged those interests. The model will
look at analytical, rather than quantitative, evidence in order to
understand the relationship between the rivals as well as explain how
Algeria has utilized its relationship with the Polisario to undermine
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Moroccan interest in Western Sahara. The analysis is based on the
argument that Algeria has regional hegemonic ambitions, and is
utilizing the Polisario to challenge Morocco for hegemonic supremacy in
the Maghreb.
The following chapters will examine the issue of hegemonic
stability, rivalry and how Algeria has made attempts to challenge their
rival for dominance of the Maghreb region. Chapter 2 will further
discuss the concepts of hegemony and rivalry. Examining how rivalries
play out will help to understand Algerian and Moroccan concerns and
points of conflict. Chapter 3 will explain the Western Sahara conflict as
well as Morocco’s objectives for incorporation of the territory into
“greater Morocco.” The chapter will also examine the relationship
between Morocco and Algeria in order to better understand its goals
and objectives in the conflict. Chapter 4 will examine Algeria’s strategy
in the conflict, looking at whether its actions towards Morocco have
undermined Morocco’s goals with Western Sahara and its ability to
become a regional hegemon. Furthermore the section will determine if
Algeria has benefitted from weakening Morocco’s position on issues
surrounding Western Sahara and thereby achieved regional hegemon
status within the Maghreb.
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Chapter 2: The regionalization of hegemony
Literature on hegemony has from the beginning sought to understand
how states are able to exert control on others in the international
system. Those within the field have worked to understand how one
entity can dominate the political or economic discussion any number of
states. The idea of hegemony is built off the work of Krasner and
Russett, which dwell on the diminished influence of the United States
in the world after the Vietnam War. Linking economic factors with
political ambition and control, Kindelberger, Krasner and Slidell sought
to better understand how states gain, maintain and lose power. The
developments in this period helped to explain the dominance of the US
(and the United Kingdom before World War II) and how it was losing
its ability to lead the world.
Stephen Krasner sought to understand the economic
arrangement of state power politics. He argued the need to
understand power politics as well as trade under the auspices of
opportunity costs in terms of trade (1976, 320). Utilizing this idea, he
suggests the need for small states to become more open in order to
grow economically. Such openness would allow smaller states to
compete better as well as become more integrated with larger states
11

that have the perceived advantages within the trade system. This
dependence would lead to states to align over time with those who
present the best opportunity to benefit far longer – which would
require states to align with the major powers in the world (the US and
the Soviet Union).
Krasner also point out that in a hegemonic system smaller states
would take advantage of being within the system since they would
grow economically although its own political power is limited (Krasner,
322). Smaller states become an intricate part of the greater
hegemonic system since they have much to gain economically while
not threatening the political system as a whole or exerting leadership
(Kindleberger, 1981, 249). This is important in understanding how
hegemonic stability theory can be applied to rivalry theory, because
the lack of opposition against international hegemons like the US, the
Soviet Union or Great Britain (before World War II) would allow the
smaller states to position themselves against each other on the lower
level of the political system. This repositioning within hegemony allows
each state to show why they would be more important than its rivals
and allow for more recent competition between the states.
Understanding Krasner and Kindelberger’s early works help to
bridge the gap between the emergence of the field in the 1960s and
1970s and how authors like Mearsheimer understood the context in
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the 1990s. As the United States has become the singular power in the
post-Cold War era, discussion shifted towards understanding how a
state or states could maintain hegemonic control. Bruce Russett, for
example, has sought to understand hegemony through alternative
methods like cultural diffusion rather than in the traditional means of
trade and economic superiority. He suggested (1985) that the success
of the hegemon was through the allocation of private goods, and that
the shift is based on the whole global system being modified by the US
to maintain American interest and dominance (Russett, 208). Even he,
however, saw the emergence of peace issues in the Third World and
regime stability as a threat to American dominance. The work of
Krasner and Russett, who early on surmised the role of western
powers as a means of creating hegemonic poles, helps to create the
concepts that John Mearsheimer would question and reexamine.
Mearsheimer’s concepts of great powers became better
understood in his work The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, which
sought to explain what power actually is and how states seek to
survive. Based on this need for states to survive in an anarchical
world, he suggests there is a level of fear and power maximization
needed for a state to maintain its own presence in the world,
suggesting a balancing requiring allies or resources to maintain
leverage. While his work was based on European power politics, he
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also attempted to explain the rise of China in the 21st century,
suggesting that the US never acted as a true hegemon on the world
stage but as a balancing force to the Soviets during the Cold War and
against both Russia and China during the current decade. His work,
based on the roles of European powers, does create a basis for
understanding smaller hegemonic battles – especially his interest in
the ideas of balance and unbalance multipolar. His sole focus on
European hegemony and views on the US as a balancer and not a
hegemon further allows his research and concepts to be extrapolated
to smaller regional blocs like the Maghreb (Mearsheimer).
In terms of regional hegemony, Mearsheimer’s work in the field
has led to others examining the same issues. This has also increased
interest in understanding regional rivalries. While hegemonic stability
looks at the economic value of a state’s power and the regional rival
looks originally at the military aspect of state power, both deal with
how states interact and perceive each other. Indeed, hegemonic
stability theory itself holds a need for a rival to emerge against the
perceived hegemon for the system to stay in balance – or for multiple
parties to compete should a power vacuum occur due to the collapse
of the previous dominant party. As rivalry studies have developed,
they have taken from the hegemonic field the concepts of regime
interest and security, transferring these concepts to the study of
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smaller powers (McGinnis, 1990). By positioning towards security
measures, the field is able to originally examine the relationships
between small and large states. Over time, the work has been able to
move away from the Cold War focus to try and examine relationships
between smaller states. In turn, they offer a means to better explain
and speculate on actions taken on the micro political level and any
future ramifications.
Regional rivalry is considered more of a study of securitization of
states, due in large part to the states used to study the concept.
McGinnis’ earlier work focused on India and Pakistan, Iran and Iraq,
Greece and Turkey, the Republic of Korea and the People’s Democratic
Republic of Korea as well as Ethiopia and Somalia (111). He tried to
frame the issue or rivalries between states along the lines of the Cold
War – its own militarization was in many ways due to each state’s
alliances with the US and the Soviet Union. In his work he examined
issues of security and armament of states in response to its neighbors.
In these cases, he saw its development through the scope of the end
of the Cold War, which leads to some questions of relevance.
Yet the pairings established by McGinnis give some idea of how
regional rivalries develop and stay constant. From China and Japan’s
historical conflict over Korea to their recent contest over oil access .
While many states have begun to swing in favor of Chinese economic
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interest in the region and within the developing world, Japan’s
diplomatic experience makes states still willing to side with it, even if
it’s kept quiet. As Japan has sought to strengthen their connections
with Southeast Asia, they have moved into markets that had been
under Chinese influence and both states have utilized soft power to
influence states towards supporting their position (Sohn, 2010).
Further, Japan has sought to use their own financial resources to
undermine Chinese interested in the developing world, keeping an
economic as well as security rivalry alive (Dreyer, 2006). India and
Pakistan, meanwhile, have been rivals since before independence and
division of British India in 1948 and their own rivalry continues to this
day. While it is possible to suggest that India is by far the dominant
force on the Indian subcontinent and could be the hegemon, issues
surrounding Kashmir have led to several armed conflicts and a
continuation of aggressive rhetoric between Dehli and Islamabad
(Haidar, 2008/2009).
While harder to connect when dealing with Greece and Turkey,
especially as work done by Georgiou, Kapopoulos and Lazaretou
(1996) suggested empirically there was no armed rivalry between the
states even while military expenditure went up, the suggestion of
rivals tends to be applicable with the other cases as each state showed
a willingness to align with a superpower based more on arms buildup
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rather than something far greater like economics. In each state’s case
it helped to set the tone for how the state can respond to actions
taken by its own rivals over the next twenty years. McGinnis’ work on
the subject also highlights the evolving nature of hegemonic stability
and its focus on the Great Powers when addressing the behaviors of
smaller actors within its own neighborhood. Like others (Roussea and
Garcia-Retamero, 2007) who saw asymmetrical relations between
neighbors leading towards threat fears, McGinnis sees the realist
nature of rivalry within a zero-sum game. Like in hegemonic stability,
rivalry theory sees the world through competition that leads in time to
power being condensed in a small amount of states.
The development of the regional rivalry concept has helped to
clarify how relationships between neighbors and rivals grow. It is
suggested by some that the idea of a rivalry must be defined as
competition within the zero-sum game framework (Goertz and Diehl,
1992, 153). By taking a more realist approach on the subject, rivalries
could focus less on the economic definitions found in hegemonic
stability and better shape how rival hegemons can occur. When the
idea of the zero-sum game is combined with “contested issues”
(Bennet, 1996) which can lead to a disagreement “over the resolution
of some issue(s) between them for an extended period of time
(Bennet, 160),” the rival states involved in a struggle for influence and
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control over a region have created its own sense of purpose that fuel
the conflict between them.
The ideas of Goertz, Bennet and others have helped to spell out
the ideas of regional rivalry and frame the various perspectives that
help explain why states view its neighbors as rivals. Further, its
concepts help to define the very nature of the conflicts the states have
created amongst themselves or have had fostered onto them – be
they based on spatial or positional conflicts as defined by Thompson in
his work on principal rivalry (1995) or the simple issue of
disagreements over conflict as defined by Bennet. The idea that rivalry
can happen on a regional level may not be new, but the interest
outside the confines of the Cold War is. Indeed, looking at the
literature over the past twenty years shows signs of a redefining of the
regional rivalry concept along lines of national security as well as
economic issues that shape and define work on hegemonic stability.
While this work is not looking at the economics of rivalry
between states, the idea that economics, security and government can
build a rivalry feeds into the ideas of stability that Krasner and others
would argue in the 1960s. By bridging the economic necessity of
hegemons with the natural rivalries that develop between states in
certain regions, this suggests the actions taken by states in order to
prevent one from gaining hegemonic control over the region are
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normal actions taken in order to maintain a certain balance between
the states. If one agrees with the zero-sum approach taken by Goertz
and Diehl and others who apply rational choice towards the conflict
between rivals, it would also build the idea of hegemonic stability
towards a localized understanding.
A different view of rivalry comes on the issues of the threat
states pose towards each other. While there is a possible issue of
identity involved in creating security issues through perceived threats
(Roussea and Garcia-Retamero, 745), states who feel a weakness in
military power sense the problems that develop into rivalry. Like
McGinnis, the race to arm fuels the desires of those involved in a
rivalry to emerge as the better armed and the better prepared for
possible conflict. However, the threat can instead build into a power
position that allows for states to dictate policy and actions to its
neighbors (Dahl, 1957). If this is truly the case, then the actors
involved in a rivalry would aspire to be viewed as the hegemon within
its own relationship – and such a view would shape its own interests
on the regional level.
There has been even an attempt to understand a multi-level
hegemony, which would see the regional and global hegemon fighting
each other for access to new markets and an attempt to work between
states (Deyermond, 2009). This different approach to rivalry studies
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embraces the economic nature of hegemonic stability while seeing the
willingness of states at different levels of global interaction secure
themselves against each other. While work on Central Asia sees the
complex links between the US as a global hegemon, Russia as the
regional hegemon and Uzbekistan and China as emerging regional
(and in China’s case, global) hegemons it also highlights how
dominance can still occur at various levels of interaction from the
economic and security levels. Comparatively, the ideas presented in
this discussion can be applied to the actions taken by Morocco and
Algeria against each other while dealing with actions taken by the US,
France, Spain and international organizations all within the context of
Western Sahara. In other words, the ideas of Kindelberger and Krasner
when understanding economic supremacy and hegemony have led
over time to the security issues that scholars like McGinnis and Bennet
examine. In terms of the thesis, Algeria’s support of the Polisario could
be taken as part of its rivalry with Morocco, and its goal of hegemony
in the region a development of its relationship with its rival.
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Chapter 3: Framing the narrative: Morocco, Algeria and
Western Sahara
This chapter is focused on explaining the complicated relationship
between Morocco, Algeria and Western Sahara. The first part examines
Western Sahara itself – its people, its history, its resources and
geography. This creates a better sense of what the territory is and has
to offer those who seek to control it. The second section deals with the
War for Spanish (Western) Sahara and Morocco’s attempts to
incorporate the rechristened Western Sahara as the southern
provinces of Morocco. This section also examines the development of
the Polisario Front, the establishment of the SADR and the rise of
Algeria as the major sponsor of the front.
The final section examines the rivalry between Algeria and
Morocco – rooted in border disputes that help to develop each side’s
interest in Western Sahara. Each section shows the historical nature of
the conflict between the two rivals and how Western Sahara has
become an issue between Algeria and Morocco. This conflict suggests
how Morocco can challenge Algeria in the region for supremacy as well
as how Algeria has sought to keep Morocco from gaining dominance
over its neighbors.
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Western Sahara: A Primer
Western Sahara is a strip of land along the Atlantic coast of Africa. The
territory sits on 266,000 sq. km of land, which borders Morocco,
Algeria and Mauritania. The territory has a total coastline of 1,110 km
and a total population of 522,928 (CIA, 2012). Many of the Sahrawi
(Western Saharan) people do not live within the territory but rather in
the camps outside of Tindouf, Algeria. When one looks at a map of
Western Sahara, it becomes clear why many would assume it already
was a part of Morocco. A majority of the population of Western Sahara
descends from the Berber tribes of the region (Hodges, 1984), and are
traditionally nomadic. The Berbers had been dependent on their
nomadic traditions throughout the centuries for its state’s economy as
well as basic survival (Hodges, 75). Since Spanish control ended in the
1970s, Morocco has moved a number of Moroccans into the state for
both work and, as believed by the Polisario, as a means to shift the
population towards Moroccan sympathies (Zunes and Mundy, 2010).
The territory, while arid, is known for having one of the largest
phosphate reserves in the world. The mineral, a necessity for fertilizers
and farming, is considered a major resource for the region, and has
already led to USD 1 billion a year in sales to Morocco (Simanowitz,
2009). The rise in phosphates extraction comes in line with growth in
iron, uranium and zirconium – all that help to build the case for a
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major supplier of minerals on the world stage. Morocco and
international companies have also sought to find oil and gas reserves
along the coastline of Western Sahara (Simanowitz, 301), which would
only add to the economic growth of the territory but currently are
shifted to Morocco. There is also a belief the coastal areas of Western
Sahara may present future oil revenues, with both the Moroccan and
the SADR governments working in the early part of the millennium to
secure contracts for future oil exploration once the Western Sahara
question has been settled (Western Sahara Campaign, 2003).
In addition to minerals, Western Sahara is noted for its fishing
waters. Morocco has profited from growth in the fisheries, thanks to
deals worked out with the European Union in which Moroccan
waterways are not defined. The failure of the EU and Morocco to
establish a demarcation line for Western Sahara waters allows fishing
to occur off the coast, which violates UN Resolution 1514(XV) (302).
With the European Union increasing trade with Morocco without
excluding the Western Saharan territory (which other states like the
US have), it places Morocco in a position where they are profiting off
sales that should not be allowed in the marketplace. Morocco has
responded that the sale of resources is helping to fuel development in
the territory (Borrell and Grushkin, 2010).
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The conflict in the Spanish Sahara and the rise of the Polisario
Western Sahara has had a long history of conflict that has shaped its
history as well as relations between itself and its neighbors. The
territory was first claimed by Spain at the 1884 Berlin Conference
(Spector, 2009). At the time the population was mostly nomadic and
Spain failed to make much of the territory over the years. In 1961
Spain moved the Spanish Sahara’s status to non-self-governing
territory under the auspices of the UN Charter (Spector). The UN,
dealing with conflict between Spain and Morocco, would further push
Spain towards allowing the Sahrawi a vote for independence in 1965,
1967, 1968, 1972 and 1973 (Marks, 1976). While facing several
nationalist uprisings (Marks, 8) Spain would eventually withdraw from
Spanish Sahara in 1975. The Polisario Front would arise during this
period, rising up against Spain in 1973 as a means to assert the
Sahrawi desire for independence (Ben-Meir, 2010).
While Spain was in the middle of war and planning its eventual
withdraw from the territory, other states would take interest. Morocco
and Mauritania sought to claim the territory through historical links
that the International Court of Justice rejected in October 1975
(Spector). Undaunted, Morocco invaded the territory later that month
and Spain, facing the possibility of war and an ailing Generalissimo
Franco, agreed to terms to divide the Spanish Sahara between
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Morocco and Mauritania. The Polisario shifted its attention to the new
owners of the land, launching attacks on Moroccan and Mauritanian
lands and eventually winning a peace treaty with Mauritania in 1979.
Morocco would eventually regain Polisario-controlled lands in the
1980s. To prevent further attacks, the Moroccan government
proceeded to build high sand walls known as berms (similar to its war
strategy with Algeria in 1963) as defensive points. The berms would
expand over time to create diverging zones between the Polisario and
the government. These would create the perceived “Free Zone” of the
Polisario and the SADR at present. The Polisario would declare an
independent government in exile from Algeria in 1975 that would be
recognized by 75 governments and gain a seat in the Organization of
African States in 1982. Morocco would leave the OAU at that time in
protest and remains the only African state not a part of the successor
organization, the African Union.
The two sides would broker a peace accord in 1989 that called
for an eventual vote on independence, autonomy or some other form
of governance monitored by the UN. However, debate over the voting
lists between the Polisario and Morocco in 1994 and 2000 have
stymied any possible solution by a vote, and the Polisario has been
critical of Moroccan attempts to remove an independence vote from
the list. In the last decade there has been an emerging movement
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within Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara against Morocco, calling
themselves the Intifada with uprisings in 2005 and 2010, and the
Polisario has suggested this would become the new form of protest
against Morocco instead of armed conflict (Zunes and Mundy, 2010).
In 2003 former US Secretary of State James Baker, serving as a
special UN Envoy on Western Sahara, made an attempt to bring both
sides to an agreement on a settlement, which would dismantle the
SADR and establish a Western Sahara Authority, which would govern
for five years within Morocco. Upon those five years, the population
would vote for integration, autonomy or independence. Even with the
allowance of Moroccan settlers in the region – illegal under the
auspices of the Geneva Convention (Simanowitz) the Polisario and
Algeria agreed to the terms, while Morocco rejected them outright.
Morocco propose a new referendum that would allow for autonomy
only in 2007, which the Polisario rejected and submitted its own
proposal for a referendum. The UN Security Council requested both
sides to mediate towards a solution (Simanowitz, 303) which failed to
see results.
As of 2012 the UN Mission to Western Sahara exists, working
inside both the Moroccan and Polisario-controlled areas of the
territory. With the mandate expected to be extended this year, there
had been talks held in March to push for some sort of governance
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settlement – with Algeria and Mauritania observing the talks (Arieff,
2012). Those talks ended with a commitment towards further talks
later in the year between the Polisario and Morocco, with both sides
continuing to push their own agenda for a future settlement. However,
due to the recent protests in Western Sahara (both before a during the
Arab Spring movement of 2011) the Polisario has pushed for human
rights to be brought back onto the agenda as a means to challenge
Moroccan authority and to safeguard the local Sahrawi population from
possible abuse (Simanowitz, 2012).
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Table 2: Timeline of the Western Sahara Conflict2

1884
1958
1970
1973
1975
Oct.
16,
1975
Nov. 6,
1975
Nov.
14,
1975
19751991
Feb.
27,
1976
Aug. 5,
1979
Aug.
1979
1980s
1984

Spain granted control over what would become Spanish
Sahara
Spain merges the Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro
territories into Spanish Sahara
The Zemla Intifada occurs against the Spanish
government in the territory, Span puts down the
organization
The Polisario Front forms in Mauritania
Spain begins a negotiation of a handover of Spanish
Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania
The ICJ ruled that Spain should not have controlled
Spanish Sahara and that Morocco and Mauritania had
historical links, but that should not hinder the right to
self-determination.
The Green March occurs, sending Moroccan troops into
Spanish Sahara
The Madrid Accord is signed by Spain, Morocco and
Mauritania ceding control of the Spanish Sahara. The UN
fails to recognize the Accord
The Western Sahara War
The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is proclaimed by
the Polisario Front
Mauritania and the Polisario sign a peace accord, ending
Mauritania’s involvement in the conflict
Morocco annexes all of Western Sahara, taking claim to
the Mauritanian portion of the territory ceded by Spain in
1975.
Morocco builds berms to protect the Souther Provinces
from attack by the Polisario
The SADR wins a seat at the OAU/AU. Morocco leaves the
organization.

2

Information gathered for this timeline comes from Zunes, S. and J. Mundy. (2010) Western Sahara:
War, Nationalism, and Conflict (Ir)resolution. Syracuse University Press,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Sahara_conflict and
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Sahara_War
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Table 2 continued

Sept. A cease-fire is declared by Morocco and the Polisario. The
6, 1991 UN pushes for a referendum to determine the final status
1991
1997
2001
2003

May
2005
Oct. 9,
2010
Feb.
2011
2010 –
present

of Western Sahara
Settlement Plan (Resolution 658) endorsed by the UN,
proposing referendum on independence, autonomy or
incorporation of Western Sahara. Vote never occurs
Houston Agreement orchestrated by the UN to hold a vote
in 1998. Morocco and the Polisario disagree on how census
is to occur and who counts as Sahrawi. Vote never occurs
Baker Plan I proposed, which would only allow Western
Sahara autonomy. Algeria and Polisaro reject the plan
Baker Plan II proposed, creating a Western Sahara
Authority which would govern for five years before an
autonomy vote would occur. Algeria and the Polisaro
agreed eventually to the plan and the UN endorsed the
plan, but Morocco rejected it due to the possibility of
independence.
First Independence Intifada breaks out in Moroccan-held
territories
Gdeim Izik set up as a protest camp in Western Sahara,
taken down in November
Fresh round of protests in Western Sahara, inspired by
both Gdeim Izik and the Arab Spring protest movement
Current UN Envoy Christopher Ross has held nine rounds
of talks to bridge differences between Morocco and the
Polisario over any future settlement. Algeria and Mauritania
attend as observers. So far, nothing has happened to
change Moroccan or Polisario positions
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Algeria and Morocco: Seeds of Rivalry
While the focus of the work is on the Western Sahara issue and how
Algeria is trying to utilize the territory to undermine Morocco, it is
important to understand both the history of the Western Sahara
conflict as well as the conflict between Algeria and Morocco. Algeria
and Morocco had both been under the rule of France – Algeria as a
Regency as early as 1837 (Heggoy, 1970) and Morocco as a
protectorate in 1912 (Protectorate Treaty, 1912). France had signed
an agreement with the Moroccan government not to militarize certain
areas under Moroccan control but while both states were under French
rule both states saw official borders created in 1938 that would move
the Draa Valley – which includes the Tindouf region used by the
Polisario as its base today – into Algerian territory.
Morocco would contest this claim upon independence, arguing
that the Draa region had been under Moroccan rule before European
powers interfered with borders. However the Algerians argued that the
territory belonged to them under French law as well as agreements
made in 1904 and 1912 with Spain (Heggoy, 20). Small-scale conflict
between the states would occur in 1962 and 1963, as Morocco would
move troops into the disputed areas and then withdraw them while
Moroccan press would use the issue to encourage greater nationalism
amongst the population (Farsoun and Paul, 1976). The two states
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would finally engage in war in October 1963 over the disputed area
which would see Morocco fail to take over the region. The Sand War
would begin the process of positioning the two states as rivals in the
region, as talks over Tindouf and the southwest boundaries of Algeria
would push well into the 1970. In 1972 the Organization of African
Union would draw the final lines that would result in the Moroccan and
Algerian border – lines Algeria would ratify and that Morocco would
allow to stand, even as they failed to ratify (Zartman, 1987).
Some like William Thompson (2001) have argued that the rivalry
between Algeria and Morocco “ended” in 1984 (p.577) due to a failure
of continued military action. However, as Algeria and Morocco continue
to arm and maintain its current policies in regards to Western Sahara
as well as each other, this analysis could be questioned. Recently,
Algeria and Morocco engaged in its own arms race due to
counterterrorism and the rise of al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM),
although Algeria has been more directly affected by Islamist threats
(Carney, 2009). Algeria’s links to Russia due to oil supply have helped
the state to increase its arms buildup that prompted Morocco to
request and increase in arsenal from the US, the Netherlands and
eventually France (Carney), although both sides have made clear the
arming is needed due to the threat AQIM poses to its security.
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Neither state has sought to provoke the other into armed conflict
recently. Yet the rise in arms buildup and the continued rivalry
between Algeria and Morocco has led some like Carney to suggest both
states are attempting to become more strategically significant to the
West – especially the United States. As its own rivalry from the past
moves into the 21st century it becomes more apparent that they
maintain a steep desire for influence and control. With the borders
between the states still closed and both states having pulled allies and
neutral parties towards its side on the Western Sahara issue from the
Arab League, the African Union and the United Nations (Vaquer,
2007), each continues to pursue a strategy of counterbalancing each
other and giving a greater appearance of leadership and authority
within the Maghreb.
While both states have failed to take up arms against each
other, Algeria’s support of the Polisario allows them a proxy to use in
terms of political and military conflict. Using the Polisario has allowed
Algeria to insert itself within the discussion for a future settlement of
the conflict while absolving themselves of responsibility. Considering
the territorial rivalry between Morocco and Algeria has existed since
independence (Rasler and Thompson, 49) and that both states
continue to seek out new advantages against each other due to the
US’ War on Terror, it should be expected that the rivalry would
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continue to exist even during periods of friendlier relations.
Considering both states view each other skeptically and at times as a
threat to regional stability due to their own hegemonic ambitions,
friendlier relations may be linked to future agreements over Western
Sahara. In the case of these states, Western Sahara has been central
to exploiting its developing rivalry.
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Chapter 4: Algeria’s Opposition to Moroccan Interests in the
Western Sahara
This chapter examines perceived goals and objectives of the Moroccan
government in regards to Western Sahara and examines how Algeria
has attempted to undermine Morocco’s ability to succeed. The analysis
is based on Algeria’s hegemonic ambitions and its strategy to counter
influence by Morocco. The chapter is based on the argument that in
order to achieve regional hegemony in North West Africa, Algeria has
attempted to oppose Morocco’s objectives in regards to Western
Sahara. By working against Morocco’s interests on the conflict, Algeria
would then be able to offer its voice on a regional and international
level and strengthen its leadership position in the Maghreb. This would
then allow Algeria to foster the perception that it is the subregional
hegemon in the region.
The section begins with a presentation of possible goals of the
Moroccan government in regards to Western Sahara – what the state
hopes to achieve once incorporation has been accomplished (either
through direct incorporation or through an autonomy process). These
goals are created based on research on Moroccan interest in Western
Sahara. Each possible reason for Morocco’s actions towards an

34

ultimate incorporation of the territory will be examined by looking at
current and previous public records and information. An examination
of the current policy practices of Morocco and others can show how
states have responded to Morocco’s attempts to exert control over
Western Sahara and shift world opinion in its favor. Further, should
states show resistance towards Morocco it would suggest that Algeria
is trying to influence the resolution of the conflict. Algeria’s role or
influence on each issue will be examined as well, especially in terms of
how Algeria has been able to successfully challenge Morocco. It will
also examine if the problems with Moroccan authority over Western
Sahara are outside the realm of Algerian influence and whether Algeria
benefits from negative international perceptions of Morocco’s interests
in the region.
For the hypothesis of this thesis to be confirmed, there should be
an indication of Algerian negative influence on how Morocco’s claims
on Western Sahara are viewed internationally. However, if the findings
suggest Morocco has been successful in changing regional and
international views on Western Sahara or the Polisario, then it would
be considered as weakening Algeria’s position. However, if Algeria has
been able to maintain previous attitudes on Western Sahara or been
successful in limiting Moroccan claims on the territory – either through
direct action or covert support of others – then it would be viewed as
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strengthening Algeria’s position. Where the Western Sahara issue is
concerned, both states involved in the matter have been persistent in
trying to undermine the other. By examining the cases through known
policy position and published information will allow for a better
understanding of each state’s ability to promote its agenda as well as
Algeria’s ability to emerge as the regional hegemon at the behest of
Morocco in its attempts to gain victory in the conflict.
In other words, the overall attempt of this research is to
determine Algeria’s capacity to exert regional –and to some extent
international leadership on Western Sahara matters. Should it succeed
in shaping the debate, Algeria would be viewed as a viable regional
hegemon.
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Morocco’s endgame? Positioning for regional supremacy
Morocco’s desire to incorporate Western Sahara creates many possible
opportunities to enhance its position internationally and within the
region. In doing so they would be able to not only challenge Algeria for
regional supremacy, but surpass their rival to be viewed as a possible
hegemon for the Maghreb. To do this, Morocco would need to achieve
certain goals against both Algeria and the Polisario to weaken their
status in the region. To create such goals, this thesis has reviewed
works from major scholars in the field of Western Sahara – specifically
Stephen Zunes and Yahia Zoubir, as well as others like Ben-Meir and
Maghraoui - to examine what Morocco wants. This research helps to
formulate possible goals of the Moroccan government that would be
attained once Western Saharan incorporation had occurred. By
creating these goals, Algeria’s means of challenging Morocco over the
territory can be better understood.
One such opportunity over the territory would allow Morocco to
not only increase its boundaries but also consolidate international
views on the issue in its favor. A final treaty between the government
and the Polisario would allow the state to have its boundaries
internationally recognized and allow Morocco to shift its interests
elsewhere internally, especially if the result led to the Sahrawi
population supporting autonomy or integration into the state. This
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would also allow the international community to recognize Moroccan
claims on the area and create a greater level of stability in regional
politics, weakening Algeria’s position within the region and
undermining the ability of the Polisario to exert influence within
Western Sahara. As a result, such actions would allow Morocco the
ability to project leadership and stability within the region and create a
sense of hegemonic superiority over its neighbors.
Secondly, a settlement on the Western Sahara matter would
force states and organizations to end its support for the Polisario. As it
stands the continued recognition of the Polisario through recognition of
the SADR damages Morocco’s ability to exert control over the territory.
Further, it increases the international standing of the opposition and
prevents Morocco from achieving any of its long-terms plans in the
region. As long as other states continue to recognize either the SADR
as the independent government for the Sahrawi or the Polisario as the
official representatives of the people, Morocco is limited in exerting
control over the full territory and must counter its rivals in the region
for influence and position. By achieving incorporation of Western
Sahara into Morocco, the Polisario would become marginalized within
Morocco and would lose support in the international community.
The third point regarding Morocco’s desire to incorporate
Western Sahara deals with resource allocation. Once the territory is
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legally incorporated, Morocco would have greater access to maritime
and land-based resources that would make its position in North West
Africa much stronger. As noted by Sören Lind and Toby Shelly
(Summary Report, 2010), questions over the control of phosphates, oil
and fisheries within Western Sahara persist and have become central
to Morocco’s policy in the region. By having full legal access to the
resources, rather than the current use of the resources that has run
into conflict with activist groups, international companies as well as
the European Union, Morocco would be able to better develop the
Western Sahara as well as better profit off the resources found in the
region. This would greatly increase its ability to lead in the Maghreb
and better position the state compared to Algeria.
Finally, all these issues relate to making Morocco a more viable
regional hegemon. Once the question on Western Sahara has been
settled, Morocco would be able to build on greater support from its
Western allies – the United States and France – and better position
itself in a post-Gadhafi Maghreb region to be the central power base.
As a greater Morocco would increase its mineral and fisheries wealth,
the state would be viewed more viable economically within the region
and decrease the influence Algeria currently has in regional politics.
Ousting the Polisario from control over the Sahrawi would further
increase Morocco’s leadership capacity in the region.
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These four possible objectives of Morocco are central to this
analysis because in each case Algeria and the Polisario have sought to
challenge Morocco’s desire to be viewed as the regional hegemon.
Each suggested goal for Morocco allows it a means to not only solve its
own problems with Western Sahara, but better position itself
internationally and within the Maghreb as a major force. Further, by
resolving the Western Sahara situation, Morocco would be in a better
position to push for greater regional integration through the Arab
Maghreb Union (World Bank, 2010). The following sections examine
each possible goal from both the Moroccan and Algerian example to
see how Algeria has or has not challenged and undermined the
Moroccan government.
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Recognition of Moroccan claims towards Western Sahara
In terms of recognition, Algeria has been able to use its connections
with the Polisario on a continental level. However, since capturing
Western Sahara Morocco has struggled to have its claims on the
territory recognized outside Africa, let alone within its home region.
Part of the problem comes with the decision released by the
International Court of Justice, which in 1975 determined that while
there were some traditional links between the Sahrawi and old
Moroccan sultans before Spanish and French rule, those connections
(typically allegiances of loyalty) were not enough to legitimize
Morocco’s claims on the territory (Maghraoui, 2003, 115). Rather than
accepting the results and wait for the Spanish referendum over the
territory, Morocco sent civilians and troops into Spanish Sahara to
begin its takeover of the region. The march on Spanish Sahara would
force Spain towards handing over Spanish Sahara to Morocco and
Mauritania in Madrid later that year (Maghraoui).
Since then Morocco has been engaged in a conflict not only with
the Polisario over control over the territory, but with the Polisario and
Algeria over recognition of what they feel is rightfully its. Due to its
ground invasion after the ICJ ruling, Morocco has been seen as the
aggressor in the state (Maghraoui, 116) due to the repression of the
Sahrawi as well as its opposition to the right of the Sahrawi to self-
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determination as dictated by the UN and the ICJ. Some have raised
the point (Maghraoui, 124) that separation of Western Sahara from
Morocco would damage its sovereignty – a position taken by the
United States to this very day (Arieff).
In Morocco’s favor is the unwillingness of many in the
international community to push for a solution. Morocco has been a
willing ally of the US and from a geopolitical scope plays an important
balancing role in North Africa for Washington (Zunes and Mundy, 72).
Further, it is the position of the US that allowing a Sahrawi vote on
independence could destabilize the Moroccan monarchy, which would
threaten a major ally in North Africa (Zoubir, 2009) that has become
more important during the War on Terror.
In addition to the US, Morocco receives more aid from France in
maintaining the current situation. France has been a champion for
Morocco within the Security Council and is in many ways a
counterbalance to the objectives of its former colony Algeria.
Accordingly, it is advocating a solution to the conflict that would better
support the regime in Rabat – one in which Western Sahara would be
under Morocco’s sovereignty while allowing autonomy for the Sahrawi.
The French government was also instrumental in successfully altering
the discussion over Sahrawi independence and was able to wedge
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themselves within the proposed Baker Plan in 2001 (Zunes and
Mundy, 78).
This position allows Morocco protection from the UN when it
comes to Western Sahara, and France was willing to endorse
Morocco’s proposal for autonomy for Western Sahara with no
possibility of self-determination (Zoubir 2009, 985). However, the
position has been limited as France, the US and Spain did push for
Morocco to provide a “credible” solution with the failure of the second
Baker Plan in 2003 (Zoubir, 2007). Further, in 2009 US Secretary of
State Hilary Clinton said the following in regards to Morocco’s plan for
Sahrawi autonomy:
“Well, this is a plan, as you know, that originated in the Clinton
Administration. It was reaffirmed in the Bush Administration and
it remains the policy of the United States in the Obama
Administration. Now, we are supporting the United Nations
process because we think that if there can be a peaceful
resolution to the difficulties that exist with your neighbors, both
to the east and to the south and the west that is in everyone’s
interest. But because of our long relationship, we are very aware
of how challenging the circumstances are. And I don’t want
anyone in the region or elsewhere to have any doubt about our
policy, which remains the same. (Zoubir, 2010)”
As long as the US remains committed to the autonomy plan
suggested by Morocco, Morocco gains enough international clout to
weaken pressure by Algeria and others to compromise with the
Polisario and the Sahrawi nationals. With the US maintaining a neutral
stance officially on the territory (Al-Manar Slimi, 2009) even after its
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willingness to support the Baker plan in 2003, Morocco is further able
to utilize their major allies’ disinterest in allowing for an independent
Sahrawi homeland to continue to propose its own plans over control
over the territory.
In 2011, Morocco reiterated its interest in negotiating a proper
settlement over Western Sahara while further arguing its position over
the conflict and the Polisario. For instance, Moroccan Foreign Minister
Taïb Fassi Fihri said the following:
“Morocco reiterates its full readiness to pursue and intensify the
negotiation process to find a consensual political solution to the
artificial regional dispute over the Moroccan Sahara, on the basis
of the autonomy initiative that the Security Council has
considered, through six successive resolutions, as serious and
credible (UN, 2011)”
Morocco continues to push its goal for incorporating Western
Sahara into Morocco thanks in part of support from allies in France and
the US, but also due to the UN considering autonomy as a viable
option instead of full independence.
Algeria, on the other hand, has sought to utilize the invasion and
Morocco’s attempts to control the territory to its advantage. While
Morocco views international resistance to recognizing its claim as
based on Algerian manipulation (Maghraoui, 124), there are some
within Algeria that fear that should Western Sahara be recognized as
the “Southern Provinces” of Morocco that it would not only throw off
the balance of power in the region, but whet appetites in Rabat to
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pursue claims towards Tindouf and southwest Algeria (Zoubir 2007).
Considering Algeria’s own fear of conflict, it has sought to challenge
Morocco’s claims to the territory and back the Polisario and the SADR
as the legitimate power over the area. This comes from its historical
support for self-determination of people and Algeria’s own history of
conflict with France. Jacob Mundy says as much when examining
Algeria’s role in the conflict:
“…self-determination is an important aspect of the normative
framework through which Algerian nationalism constitutes itself
and through which the Algerian government has tended to
articulate its foreign policy. The ideal of self-determination
indisputably played a key discursive role in Algeria’s struggle for
independence and so there is a sense in which Algerian leaders
seen in Polisario clear parallels with their struggle for
independence. Support for Western Saharan resistance is thus
not only consistent with Algeria’s national values, but also its
history.” (Mundy, 2010, 3-4)”
Algeria has been most vocal on the international stage in its
support for the Sahrawi cause and helped the state gain entry to the
Organization for African Unity and the successor African Union – which
Morocco withdrew from in 1984 and remains the only nonmember on
the continent. Algeria has also seen other states recognize the SADR
or the Polisario as the official voice of the Sahrawi and support the
idea of Sahrawi self-determination (Benabdallah, 2009). As states
show support for the position made by the UN in the 1970s – that
Western Sahara should be governed by the Sahrawi - Algeria has not
directly created this development but has been able to benefit from
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state’s sympathies for the Sahrawi as a means of limiting Morocco’s
perceived aggression.
In the end, Algeria’s greatest argument against Morocco’s claims
on Western Sahara is that no state besides Morocco – not even its
strongest supporter France – recognizes it (Zoubir 2007, 167). When
Morocco made its 2007 autonomy proposal, Algeria and the Polisario
were able to reject it outright as it failed to include an option for
independence, and positioned Morocco as the aggressor state yet
again. It is this conflicting development between them that Algeria has
been able to use against Moroccan interests. Algeria, while not forcing
the matter beyond supporting the Sahrawi cause, will continue to
benefit from Morocco’s inability to have its claims recognized. In this
way, Algeria can be viewed as a stronger force in the region.
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Ending recognition of the Polisario abroad
Morocco has, since the takeover of Western Sahara, sought to
challenge the Polisario’s base abroad. While it is somewhat focused on
having the territory recognized as part of a greater Morocco, lessening
the Polisario’s support abroad would allow Morocco a better advantage
in negotiating any possible solution with the group. Because of
Algeria’s continued support for the Polisario, Morocco has been
“bogged down” (Arieff, 6) and less capable to assert dominance and
leadership in the region, thereby weakening its capacity as a possible
regional hegemon in the long term.
To Morocco’s credit, as the war and stalemate has dragged on,
the numbers have begun to fall on its side. With Morocco fostering the
perception of the Polisario as a front for Algerian aggression, as well as
pushing its own agenda for autonomy within Morocco, it has been able
to persuade states to withdraw recognition for the SADR. Morocco has
been aided by France, which has been accused of paying off states to
withdraw its support for the Polisario and the SADR (Zoubir 2007).
Unlike its interest in keeping Morocco from incorporating
Western Sahara, Algeria has a greater need to develop and maintain
the Polisario presence. Algeria has a legitimate concern about a future
solution between the Polisario and Morocco, since the SADR are based
within Algerian borders. As such, it has become more and more
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apparent to Algeria to advocate for more recognition of the Polisario as
the official government for Western Sahara. With the number of
nations that recognize either the Polisario as the voice of the Sahrawi
or the SADR as the official representative of Western Sahara (see
Appendix 1) shifting over time, Algeria has been able to count on other
states to show at least sympathy with the cause of the Sahrawi and
with the Polisario – leverage they can utilize against Moroccan interest.
Algeria’s other success in preventing the marginalization of the
Polisario is its strict refusal to participate in negotiations. While many
may question Algeria’s actual interest in the conflict, they have stayed
out of all negotiations regardless of pressure. While some, like
Mohammed Benouna (the Moroccan UN representative) have argued
that Algeria should be forced to negotiate since “Polisario cannot
negotiate without the blessing of Algeria (International Crisis Group,
2007),” Algeria has always maintained the position that it is only
concerned for the Sahrawi and that the Polisario speak for the people.
Mohammed Tefiani, the director of Algerian relations with the rest of
Africa, said that Algeria “reject[s] any approach that attempts to force
an Algeria-Moroccan dialogue on Western Sahara (ibid).”
While it would be impossible to show that Algeria has directly
weakened Morocco’s ability to remove the Polisario from the global
stage, on this point Algeria shows its ability to undermine its rival.
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Rather than speak as a concerned party under the auspices of “selfdetermination,” Algeria is able to press its own views without directly
involving itself in the negotiations. Should Algeria be forced to
negotiate with Morocco, the Polisario’s relevance would become rather
nonexistent and the views of the Sahrawi would be diminished.
Whether the Moroccan government agrees with it or not, the Polisario
is considered the voice of the Sahrawi people, and as long as Algeria
stays, or at least acts, above the fray, the Polisario will be able to
maintain supporters and recognition. Even with the money flowing to
buy off states for support, Algeria’s willingness to play by the UN’s
rules allows it to continue to undermine Morocco’s objective and keeps
the Polisario as a threat to the future integration of Western Sahara
into Morocco.
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Access towards maritime and interior resources
Morocco’s interest in incorporating Western Sahara does go beyond
the idea of “greater Morocco.” With Western Sahara’s possible sites of
natural resource development, the territory becomes far more valuable
beyond nationalist desires. Morocco has made it a point that its work
in the territory is part of greater development for the region, and will
only help to take the Sahrawi population forward. While there may be
a legitimate question over how much control Morocco would allow an
autonomous Sahrawi region within its border in terms of negotiations
for resource extraction, the fact that Morocco has already begun to
profit from the territory means Morocco is in a position to legitimize its
control over the area.
Indeed, with the state trying to profit on the sale of fish
contracts and phosphates, Morocco would be wise to integrate the
Western Sahara within its legal boundaries. As it stands, states
continue to struggle with dealing with products sold from Western
Sahara, as noted by the Stockholm Environmental Institute in 2010
(Summary Report). The group, in a conference dealing specifically with
the sale of phosphates and its effects on food supply and management
and how it affects Western Sahara, argued it would be wise to boycott
the sale of such products from the region since they were taken
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illegally – tying the debate back to full legal recognition of Morocco’s
stewardship of the territory as part of its “Southern Provinces.”
Another part of this debate stems from conflict with the Polisario
over the control of waterways. The Polisario had sought in 1987 an
agreement with the European Union to promote fisheries along the
coast line – an agreement the EU declined. However, the EU would
reach the same agreement with the Moroccan government in 2006,
one that the Polisario called “a massive enterprise of plundering and
amassing of natural wealth…and a flagrant violation of international
law (Benabdallah, 423).” and others criticized
Yet in terms of undermining Morocco’s ability to profit from such
resources, Algeria has sorely failed to push any agenda. As it stands,
much of the push-back on Morocco’s investment come from the
Sahrawi activists abroad, the Polisario as well as other activist groups
that question the sale of goods from the territory. Algeria itself, having
been focused on the political endgame, has expressed no views on
matters over resources outside the confines of Sahrawi control over
them. With Algeria marginalized as long as Morocco is able to sell
phosphates and work out fishing deals with other states that enter
Saharan waters, it stands to have little to no footing in undermining its
rival.
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Yes, Morocco continues to profit from its dealings abroad in
terms of major resources. Yet as long as the borders remain unsettled,
Morocco will continue to feel pressure from outside organizations and
companies that will not purchase goods or create contracts that profit
from Western Sahara goods. While this may weaken Morocco in the
eyes of investors and activists, Algeria has not been able to profit from
the conflict in a leadership role outside calling for a political solution to
the boundaries of Morocco and the self-determination of the Sahrawi.
As it stands, Algeria has failed to directly undermine Morocco in this
point. While Algeria has no direct influence on other states concerning
the extraction of resources, they will benefit over time should states
begin to resist the opportunity to trade with Morocco goods coming
from the territory. But its success is incidental and not based on its
own involvement on the issue, lessening its image as a regional leader
on this issue.
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Strengthening Morocco’s position in the Maghreb and abroad
With Algeria and Morocco as regional rivals for dominance, each seeks
a means to position itself as a regional leader. Both states had been
competing for influence against Libya, but with the recent change in
government in Tripoli there is a greater chance to exert leadership in
the region in order to diminish Libya’s standing and become the
stronger force in the Maghreb. With Tunisia in transition and
Mauritania considered a weaker state comparatively, it allows the two
to engage in direct challenges against each other in the region and
abroad.
Algeria has sought out means to challenge Morocco politically
and economically for leadership in the region for some time. While
Morocco has been able to benefit from Sahrawi resources due to the
failure of a final framework that would address the state, Algeria has
been able to promote itself as a “champion of colonial peoples and
alienates Morocco from regional leadership (Carney, 2009).” As Africa
itself tends to regionalize itself within clusters, the failure of the
Maghreb to unite has been linked to Algeria and Morocco’s battles over
Western Sahara, and Algeria has been rather successful in promoting
its own agenda against its neighbors within the African continent.
One aspect is the role of the US and France and how its position
towards Morocco has influenced the lack of a successful peace plan. In
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2003 James Baker presented to the UN a draft resolution for a possible
peace deal. While including clauses for a vote that would offer the
option of integration or autonomy within the state to the Sahrawi,
Morocco rejected the deal because “independence” was included as
part of the agreement, which they argued was incompatible with the
territorial integrity of Morocco and could lead to instability in the
region (Zunes and Mundy). Thanks in part to the War on Terror, both
Morocco and Algeria have become major players to the United States
in North Africa (Solá-Martin, 2009). Since Morocco has become more
important to the US, it creates a new level of rivalry between the two
sides in their attempt to position each as the more desirable state in
the region.
In 2009, as a response to the 2007 initiative taken by Morocco,
Secretary of State Clinton continued to promote American support for
the Moroccan plan. More support came in 2010 by members of the US
Senate, who called the proposal for autonomy under Moroccan control
“the ‘sole realistic solution’” (Ben-Meir, 65). Algeria, while maintaining
pressure on the African Union and to some extent in the UN, continues
to see its views brushed aside by the West, especially the United
States. Actions taken by Algeria and South Africa in 2011 to prevent
Morocco’s election to the Security Council highlight this further
(Bennis, 2011), as they were unable to convince fellow members of
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the UN that there would be a risk of the Western Sahara conflict
ending on less than favorable terms for the Sahrawi. Both states,
major supporters for the Polisario and Sahrawi independence, failed to
reduce the votes needed for Morocco to earn a seat in the council. In
this framework, actions taken by Algeria in support of the Polisario
tend to be overridden by the West. However, with others questioning
the usefulness of Algeria in negotiations over a future peace plan, it
could lead to a strain between the West and Algeria if it is viewed as
an obstacle to peace.
The result of such actions taken has led Algeria to both
strengthen and weaken itself and Morocco on the global stage. As both
struggle to be viewed as the major player in Maghreb affairs and to
champion its positions abroad, Algeria has been forced to work behind
the scenes to weaken its neighbor. While such actions have proven
successful in Africa and help to strengthen its position there, Morocco’s
greater international appeal and support weakens Algeria’s best
attempts to weaken its rival. On this point, it appears that Algeria is
only marginally successful in undermining Moroccan hegemonic
objectives. However, the longer the Western Sahara conflict plays out
and the longer the Algerians support the Polisario with no major
resolution benefiting them, the more likely Algeria will become a
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weakened force in the region and be forced to accept Morocco’s
positions on the territory.
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Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusions
Algeria and Morocco have fought against each other for well over a
century, from French colonial rule to the Sand War of 1963. Both
states have sought to expand their borders and influence within the
Maghreb region, utilizing calls for greater national unity as a means to
rally support for their cause. In the case of Western Sahara, Morocco’s
historical demands to the land led to conflict between the Moroccan
Army and both Spain and the Sahrawi people. The Sahrawi, seeking
independence from Spain, fought against Morocco under the support of
the Polisario Front since 1975. Algeria, having allowed refugees from
Western Sahara into the Tindouf region in the southwest corner of
Algeria, has played a major supporter of Polisario actions since
Morocco’s march into the territory, and continues to provide political
support to this day. Morocco has been able to reclaim most of the
territory in Western Sahara from Polisario rebels and create a small
zone that the Polisario is able to work from in the state.
The historical conflicts between Algeria and Morocco help create
political problems for both states in regards to Western Sahara and the
future of the Maghreb. Both see the possibility of being the major
power amongst its neighbors in the Maghreb and even beyond. As long
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as the Western Sahara conflict persists, tension between the two
states will lead to questions over who has more power and influence in
the region. In the case of Algeria, every attempt to weaken Morocco’s
claims and control over Western Sahara makes their ability to exert
power over their neighbors much easier.
Utilizing a dual approach that incorporates the ideas of the
regional hegemon with the security issues coming from rivalry studies,
this thesis has attempted to examine whether there could be a causal
link between supporting minor opposition groups and how such
support can benefit a state’s hegemonic superiority over its neighbors.
While the case presented works only in terms of understanding Algeria
and Morocco, such a notion could prove useful towards understanding
rivalries between states. However, in this case Algeria’s continued
support for the Polisario Front and its backing of the Sahrawi Arab
Democratic Republic has only given it minor advantages in its rivalry
with Morocco.
Algeria’s successes in frustrating Morocco’s case for
incorporating Western Sahara tend to be based on the role of the
Polisario. First, Algeria’s continued international support for the
Polisario helps to maintain some international interest in the group and
the interests of the Sahrawi for independence. Algeria has been very
successful in getting the SADR a seat on international organizations
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and maintaining pressure of Morocco from other states in regards to
the treatment of the people. Secondly, Algeria’s refusal to talk to
Morocco on Western Sahara frustrates future peace plans and
undermines Morocco’s ability to negotiate an agreement for
incorporating the territory. As long as Algeria observes talks and does
not participate, they maintain the perception that they are not
involved in the process and that they are only there for the Sahrawi
people and their long term goal of independence.
Finally, Algeria has used the Polisario as a means to weaken
Morocco’s presence internationally. While Morocco won their seat to
the Security Council, the issue of Sahrawi independence or
incorporation were used by Algeria and South Africa to build a case
against Morocco winning the seat. Further, Morocco’s ability to sell
resources found in Western Sahara has been harmed as groups put
pressure on governments to not accept goods from Morocco. While
Morocco has been able to negotiate deals on oil and phosphates,
Polisario supporters have put states in the position to reexamine deals
and not agree to certain plans. This would allow Algeria the ability to
replace Morocco in energy trading and strengthen Algeria’s place in the
region.
As long as the Moroccan government is able to impose its own
rules on the Polisario, Algeria will be forced to work from a defense
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position to maintain its relevance and prevent Algiers from being
directly involved in any settlement. As long as Algeria continues to
back the Polisario, Morocco will not be able to impose an agenda that
could be viewed by some as aggressive due to its noninterest in selfdetermination for the SADR. Economics and international politics,
however, have not been as kind in forcing Morocco’s hand as much as
Algeria would hope it would. Instead, the challenges facing Morocco
over Western Sahara tend to fall outside the interests of Algeria and
do little in the long run to suddenly challenge the status quo between
the states.
The thesis opens up future studies on how Algeria itself moves
forward towards achieving greater dominance in the Mahgreb as well
as raises interesting questions for future study. Algeria’s own stability
would come into question should Morocco successfully incorporate
Western Sahara, as those in government fear that the failure of
Morocco to accept the OAU’s findings in 1972 over the Draa Valley
would lead to future conflict. The role of Algeria in handling refugees
also sets itself for study, as the state could be faced with a greater
Sahrawi population if Morocco forces a resolution of their own.
Morocco’s ambitions within the Maghreb have been studied for some
time but with the Mediterranean Union’s relationship between the EU
and Northern Africa, Morocco would be interested in aligning itself
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more with Europe and creating a power position within their home
region. Other directions future research on the conflict could examine
how ethnicity and culture between the Berber Sahrawi and the more
Arab Moroccan population could be a catalyst for conflict over the
future of the territory.
With Morocco ascending to the Security Council for a two year
stay, there is now a greater chance for Morocco to press for an
advantage and gain leverage and dominance over its rivals. For the
time being, however, Algeria has shown through its linkage with the
Polisario that it is able to achieve minor advantages and gains that
weaken its rival. Until the Western Sahara matter is properly settled,
Algeria will still be viewed as an obstacle towards peace due to its
rivalry with Morocco, but Algeria will continue to see itself as a
defender of the rights of self-determination for all, and use this belief
as a means to further undermine Morocco both in the Mahgreb and on
the global stage.
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Appendix A
Recognition of Moroccan and Polisario/SADR claims on
Western Sahara
Recognition of the SADR (ordered by Date of Recognition)
(Note: asterisk denotes full diplomatic relations and the exchange of
ambassadors)
*Algeria (March 6, 1976)
*Angola (March 11, 1976)
Mozambique (March 13, 1976)
Korea, Democratic People’s Republic (March 16, 1976)
Rwanda (April 1, 1976)
*Panama (June 23, 1978)
Tanzania (November 9, 1978)
Ethiopia (February 24, 1979)
Vietnam (March 2, 1979)
Laos (May 7, 1979)
Ghana (August 24, 1979)
Guyana (September 1, 1979)
Jamaica (September 4, 1979)
Nicaragua (September 9, 1979)
Uganda (September 6, 1979)
*Mexico (September 8, 1979)
Lesotho (October 9, 1979)
Cuba (January 20, 1980)
Iran (February 27, 1980)
Sierra Leone (March 27, 1980)
Syria (April 15, 1980)
Libya (April 15, 1980)
Botswana (May 14, 1980)
Zimbabwe (July 3, 1980)
Mali (July 4, 1980)
Chad (July 4, 1980)
*Vanuatu (November 27, 1980)
AFRICAN UNION (February 22, 1982)
*Mauritius (July 1, 1982)
*Venezuela (August 3, 1982)
Suriname (August 11, 1982)
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Bolivia (December 14, 1982)
Ecuador (November 14, 1983)
Mauritania (February 27, 1984)
Nigeria (November 11, 1984)
Trinidad and Tobago (November 1, 1986)
Belize (November 18, 1988)
Barbados February 27, 1988)
*El Salvador (July 31, 1989)
Honduras (November 11, 1989)
Namibia (June 11, 1990)
Malawi (November 16, 1994)
*Paraguay (February 9, 2000)
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (February 14, 2002)
*Timor-Leste (May 20, 2002)
*South Africa (September 15, 2004)
Uruguay (December 26, 2006)
Haiti (November 22, 2006)
*South Sudan (July 9, 2011)
Suspended/Cancelled Recognition of the SADR (ordered Dates of
Recognition)
Madagascar (February 28, 1976, Frozen July 4 2005)
Burundi (March 1, 1976, Cancelled relations May 5, 2006)
- Reestablished June 16, 2008, Cancelled October 25, 2010
Benin (March 11, 1976, Cancelled relations March 21, 1997)
Guinea-Bissau (March 15, 1976, Withdrew recognition March 1997)
- Reestablished relations May 26, 2009, withdrew March 20, 2010
Togo (March 17, 1976, Cancelled relations June 18, 1997)
Seychelles (October 25, 1977, Cancelled relations March 17, 2008)
Congo, Republic of (June 3, 1978, Cancelled relations September 13,
1996)
Sào Tomé and Príncipe (June 22, 1978, Cancelled relations October
23, 1996)
Equatorial Guinea (November 3, 1978, Withdrew recognition May
1980)
Cambodia (April 10, 1979, Withdrew recognition August 14, 2006)
Afghanistan (May 26, 1979, Withdrew recognition July 11, 2002)
Cape Verde (July 4 1979, Frozen July 27, 2007)
Grenada (August 20, 1979, Cancelled relations August 16, 2010)
Dominica (September 1, 1979, Withdrew recognition July 22, 2010)
Sait Lucia (September 1, 1979, Cancelled relations August 16, 2010)
Zambia (October 12, 1979, Cancelled relations March 29, 2011)
Swaziland (April 28, 1980, Suspended August 4, 1997)
Costa Rica (October 30, 1980, Frozen April 22, 2000)
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Kiribati (August 12, 1981, Cancelled relations September 15, 2000)
Nauru (August 12, 1981, Cancelled relations September 15, 2000)
Papua New Guinea (August 12, 1981, Cancelled relations April 2,
2011)
Solomon Islands (August 12, 1981, Cancelled relations January 1989)
Tuvalu (August 12, 1981, Cancelled relations September 15, 2000)
Burkina Faso (March 4, 1984, Cancelled relations June 5, 1996)
Peru (August 16, 1984, Frozen September 9, 1996)
Colombia (February 27, 1985, Frozen December 2000)
Liberia (July 31, 1985, Cancelled relations September 5, 1997)
India (October 1, 1985, Cancelled relations June 26, 2000)
Guatemala (April 10, 1986, Withdrew recognition April 1998)
Dominican Republic (June 24, 1986, Frozen May 23, 2002)
Saint Kitts and Nevis (February 25, 1987, Cancelled relations August
16, 2010)
Antigua and Barbuda (February 27, 1987, Cancelled relations August
16, 2010)
Albania (December 29, 1987, Cancelled relations November 11, 2004)
Kenya (June 25, 2005, Frozen July 20, 2006)
Recognition of Sahrawi claims on Western Sahara
AFRICAN UNION
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Belize
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Burma
Burundi
Chad
China, People’s Democratic Republic of
Chile
Congo, Republic of
Costa Rica
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
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Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Ethiopia
EUROPEAN UNION
Fiji
Finland
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Guinea-Bissau
Haiti
Iran
Ireland
Italy
Jamaica
Jordan
Korea, Republic of
Lesotho
Libya
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Mauritius
Mexico
Mozambique
Namibia
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Norway
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Portugal
Russia
Rwanda
Sào Tomé and Príncipe
Sierra Leone
Slovakia
Slovenia
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South Africa
South Sudan
Spain
Suriname
Sweden
Switzerland
Tanzania
Uganda
UNITED NATIONS
United Kingdom
Uruguay
Venezuela
Vietnam
Zimbabwe
States that recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara
Morocco
States that recognize Moroccan claims on Western Sahara
ARAB LEAGUE
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Benin
Belarus
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
China, People’s Democratic Republic of
Chile
Cambodia
Colombia
Comoros
Congo, Democratic Republic of
Djibouti
Dominican Republic
Equatorial Guinea
France
Gabon
Gambia
Guinea
Hungary
Indonesia
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Kuwait
Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of
Madagascar
Maldives
Nauru
Netherlands
Niger
Liberia
ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION
Peru
Poland
Romania
Russia
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia
Seychelles
Sudan
Swaziland
Turkey
Yemen
Sources:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_status_of_Western_Sahara
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